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German Council on Foreign Relations
The Rule of Law in 
the EU Budget
Backing Down Is Too High a 
Price for the EU to Pay
Hungary and Poland are threatening to veto the EU’s new bud-
getary arrangements if other governments apply the rule of law 
mechanism to them. It is becoming clear, however, that the new 
EU financial framework, and the much-heralded recovery fund, are 
more vital to Eastern Europe than to Europe’s South and that time 
is not on the side of the former. Awareness of this fact allows for 
a cool assessment of the pair’s bargaining positions – and of the 
precedent that any hasty resolution to the crisis will set.   
 – Since the 2021 EU budget can be agreed even without the new 
multiannual framework, time is, in fact, on the side of a maximal-
ist EU position. It is eastern members like Hungary and Poland, 
rather than southern members, that most need money.
 – Warsaw and Budapest’s need for EU cohesion funds is not the 
only reason why the duo has a weaker hand than meets the eye. 
They are both facing a backlash at home – from voters and their 
neighbors in Central Europe.
 – The temptation for other members to settle the matter with a 
quick fix is nevertheless large, not least because the budgetary 
process is complex and the rule of law mechanism itself has its 
flaws.
 – Of the three basic options available to the other member states, 
though, the time has surely come to pick the most principled 
one – meaning forging ahead without Poland and Hungary if 
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When Poland and Hungary signaled their intention to 
veto the adoption of the Recovery and Resilience Fund 
(RRF) and prevent its use as a vehicle for asserting 
the rule of law in Europe, they seemed to hold all the 
cards. Huge economic and political pressures would 
surely divide the other member states and eventually 
steer them towards compromise. If they only bent to 
Budapest and Warsaw’s demands, the other members 
would be able to do three key things: 
• Ensure the adoption of a clear new 2021 budget 
before the current Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) ends;
• Help Germany claim success for its six-month pres-
idency of the Council of the European Union; and, 
above all,
• Allow for the rapid disbursement of the RRF grants 
into Europe’s – particularly, Southern Europe’s – 
hard-hit economies.
The reality, however, is that none of these three con-
siderations imposes hard deadlines. The member 
states can adopt an annual budget for 2021 within 
the current MFF ceilings and under qualified majority 
voting (with the possible additional benefit of being 
able to tweak existing spending programs and re-
bates). This means that a final deal on the new multi-
annual budgetary package could be concluded in the 
first part of 2021 under the EU Council presidency 
of Portugal – a resilient southern member state and 
one more likely to take a clear line toward Poland 
and Hungary than their (near) neighbor Germany.
Furthermore, while it is certainly urgent for public 
spending in Europe to pick up if the EU is to blunt 
the economic consequences of the COVID-19 cri-
sis, the reality is that the bulk of that recovery ef-
fort will remain national. Whether the RRF becomes 
effective in early 2021 or early 2022 does not alter 
the fact that domestic budgets will be the primary 
vehicles of recovery. Indeed, so long as the Europe-
an Central Bank provides a backstop to national gov-
ernment borrowing, the prime virtue of the RRF is 
political in character rather than economic: it signals 
a willingness across the EU to pool borrowing and 
underwrite transfers.
1  Insofar as Budapest has a strategy here, it appears to be to secure cash from the EU (through the MFF and RRF) and notch a victory against the EU’s 
attempts to impose conditions. By escalating the crisis, it presumably hopes the political price of blocking funds will simply become too great for the 
other member states. But Hungary has given few clues about the path to de-escalation that it foresees. Scrapping the rule of law mechanism is simply not 
feasible, yet it appears locked on a confrontational course.
2  “Pénzügyminisztérium: ellenállóbbnak bizonyult a magyar gazdaság az Európai Unió átlagánál [Ministry of Finance: Hungarian economy turned out to 
be more resilient than the EU average],” koronavirus.gov.hu, August 14, 2020: <https://koronavirus.gov.hu/cikkek/penzugyminiszterium-ellenallobbnak-
bizonyult-magyar-gazdasag-az-europai-unio-atlaganal> (accessed November 24, 2020).
3  “Varga, Mihály: Akár egész jövő évben is elmaradhatnak az uniós pénzek [Varga, Mihály: EU funds may be halted over the upcoming year],” portfolio.hu, 
November 25, 2020: <https://www.portfolio.hu/unios-forrasok/20201125/varga-mihaly-akar-egesz-jovo-evben-is-elmaradhatnak-az-eu-penzek-458898> 
(accessed November 25, 2020).
ECONOMIC PRESSURES MEAN 
HUNGARY HAS A WEAKER 
HAND THAN SUPPOSED
This simple reassessment of the economic and polit-
ical pressures upon (southern) EU members suggests 
that Poland and, above all, Hungary have overplayed 
their hand. Budapest’s brinksmanship appears to rest 
on the calculation that time and politics are on its 
side. This is incorrect. Hungary is, in fact, one of the 
few EU economies that depends on external financ-
ing. Its government’s failure to secure EU funds in 
the face of growing expectations at home could be 
detrimental to its chances in the next election, which 
is due in spring 2022 at the latest.
Budapest is, of course, manufacturing precisely the 
kind of European standoff on which it thrives. For 
years now, the skilled and single-minded diplomatic 
apparatus of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s govern-
ment has excelled at milking these situations. But 
because its core motivation is, as ever, domestic pol-
itics,1 it is ironic that Orbán and his diplomats have 
now misread the situation. They have attributed 
Hungary’s own domestic weaknesses to the oth-
er member states and downplayed them at home. 
Orbán badly needs this international victory – and 
cash – to boost his chances in the next parliamen-
tary elections.
If Hungary fails to secure external financing and keep 
its economy stable, the effects will start to bite long 
before 2022 – and not just in the worst-case scenario 
in which the other member states find a way to cut 
Hungary out of the RRF and deprive it of the EUR 17 
billion it is due. The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the 
country harder than most, causing a calamitous 13.6 
percent drop in GDP in the second quarter of 2020.2 
EU money, including the RRF, remains the sole re-
maining and rationally feasible option left open for 
Hungary. The usual options – running a deficit, de-
valuing the currency, or driving up inflation – are 
unpalatable.
The deficit in the national budget is already running 
at 8 to 9 percent,3 and increasing it further is out of 
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question. Further devaluing the national currency, is 
no option either. The exchange rate of the Hungari-
an forint to the euro is already 1 to 360,4 up from 315 in 
mid-2019. And credits on the open market are much 
more expensive than the EU’s bonds would be. As for 
the option of fueling inflation, the annual inflation rate 
on certain crucial food products, such as vegetables 
and meat, is already above 10 percent.5 Hungary’s con-
tinued veto of the RRF will only increase the pain.
Hungary’s real fear is that its bluff is called by the 
other member states and that they not only drive 
through the rule of law mechanism, but also trig-
ger it immediately. Presumably it has a Plan B for this 
eventuality. Hungary might try to reopen talks on the 
mechanism and include the (lengthy) right of turn-
ing to the European Court of Justice for adjudication. 
Such an important modification is, however, unlikely 
to make it through either the European Parliament 
or the core group of member states that are strongly 
committed to the rule of law mechanism.
Therefore, if the other member states refuse to back 
down, it is hard to see how Hungary can stabilize its 
economy. Such economic considerations will not 
necessarily lead Hungarians back into the arms of 
the EU, of course. The 2016 Brexit referendum shows 
that some voters are ready to be poorer if they be-
lieve they are staving off interference from Brussels 
and reasserting national independence. But in the 
case of Hungary, the government is no longer mas-
ter of these popular pressures. And that is even more 
true of Poland, where the government has seen its 
reputation among voters nosedive since September.
POLAND’S INTERNAL DIVISION
Over the summer, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz 
Morawiecki returned from the EU summit and an-
nounced the greatest financial windfall in the histo-
ry of modern Poland – EUR 160 billion from the EU 
budget and the RRF, all while blocking the introduc-
tion of a rule of law mechanism. It was a big boast, 
and it finally came undone on November 5 when the 
workings of the rule of law mechanism were public-
ly agreed upon by the European Parliament and the 
German presidency. On November 12, Polish media 
reported that Morawiecki, like Orbán, had officially 
threatened to veto the EU budget.
4  Central Bank of Hungary, Official Daily Exchange Rates: <https://www.mnb.hu/en/arfolyamok> (accessed November 25, 2020).
5  Hungarian Central Statistical Office, First Releases, Consumer Prices, November 10, 2020:  
<https://www.ksh.hu/gyorstajekoztatok/#/hu/document/far2010> (accessed 25 November 2020).
Morawiecki’s position was and is in line with the 
tough stance taken by Jarosław Kaczyński, the lead-
er of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), and it re-
flects his desire to keep on Kaczyński’s good side. 
But it is also out of character for the prime minis-
ter. Morawiecki has a reputation as a Western, con-
ciliatory politician able to improve Poland’s strained 
relations with the EU. Indeed, his election as Prime 
Minister in December 2017 was seen as an attempt 
to normalize relations with Brussels. PiS avoids un-
equivocally negative rhetoric on the EU, most often 
calling for dialogue or blaming a single personality 
(such as EU Commissioner Frans Timmermans) for a 
conflict with European Institutions.
For these reasons,  Kaczyński himself  views 
Morawiecki as his chosen successor. The trouble is 
that the very characteristics that make Morawiecki 
attractive to Kaczyński do little to bolster his pop-
ularity within PiS. Many party members are deeply 
suspicious of a professional biography that includes 
heading a large bank and advising the government 
of former Prime Minister Donald Tusk. This, in turn, 
makes Morawiecki’s main rival, Minister of Justice 
Zbigniew Ziobro, seem more attractive. Ziobro leads 
the most radical right-wing faction within the ruling 
camp, Solidarna Polska. And, although his party en-
joys little support in the polls, Ziobro is, thanks to his 
views and style, a much more natural successor to 
Kaczyński.
Ziobro sees the standoff with the EU as a way to trap 
Morawiecki in a lose-lose situation. If Morawiecki 
succumbs to Brussels, he will lose the trust of 
In Poland and  
Hungary, the  
governments are  
no longer master of 
popular pressures.
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Kaczyński and any remaining support within PiS. If 
he vetoes the EU budget, however, he will lose the 
trust of Brussels and, above all, the European funds 
necessary to govern Poland. In mid-November, in 
an apparent attempt to increase the pressure on 
Morawiecki, Ziobro wrote the following in an open 
letter to the prime minister: “The ‘rule of law’ is only 
a pretext to introduce the institutional and political 
enslavement of the Polish state (...) We would like to 
address to the prime minister a firm request for a ve-
to of the Multiannual Financial Framework and the 
decision on the EU’s own resources.”6
And what of Kaczyński himself? His party has seen a 
steep collapse in support. From mid-2017 until quite 
recently, support for PiS never fell below 40 percent; 
now, the party polls at 27 percent. This leaves PiS 
neck and neck with the second-ranked Civic Plat-
form (currently polling at 25 percent). Morawiecki’s 
hardline position on the budget has not helped boost 
PiS’s approval ratings and was seen by many Poles 
to threaten Poland’s withdrawal from the European 
Union. The pro-government newspaper Do Rzeczy 
recently proclaimed on its cover: “Polexit – We have 
the right to talk about it.”7 In all its history, no Polish 
government has dared to even broach such a possi-
bility due to the record high public support for Polish 
membership in the EU.8 
And yet, it is not the crisis in relations with Brussels 
that is having the greatest impact on the decline in 
support for PiS – far from it. The party’s populari-
ty was hit worst by the decision of the Constitution-
al Tribunal to almost completely prohibit the right 
to abortion.9 This triggered the largest protests seen 
in Poland since 1989. And there is no doubt among 
voters that the decision was ordered by Jarosław 
Kaczyński himself. This move by Kaczyński is sur-
prising in the context of the ongoing coronavirus 
pandemic, the second factor behind the collapse of 
support for PiS. The government has been accused of 
sleeping through the summer holidays and failing to 
6  See: N.N., “Zbigniew Ziobro sent a letter to Mateusz Morawiecki. ‘Strong request’ to veto the EU budget,” Polish News, November 23, 2020: <https://www.
polishnews.co.uk/zbigniew-ziobro-sent-a-letter-to-mateusz-morawiecki-strong-request-to-veto-the-eu-budget-policy/> (accessed November 25, 2020). 
7  See: N.N., “‘Gorzej niż zbrodnia, myślozbrodnia’. Burza po zapowiedzi ‘Do Rzeczy’” [Worse than a crime, a thought crime. The storm after the announcement 
in Do Rzeczy], Do Rzeczy, November 22, 2020:  
<https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/162135/gorzej-niz-zbrodnia-myslozbrodnia-burza-po-zapowiedzi-do-rzeczy.html> (accessed November 25, 2020).
8  According to the latest research by Kantar, as many as 87 percent of respondents want Poland to remain in the European Union; only 8 percent are of the 
opposite opinion. See: Joanna Jakubowska, “87% of Poles believe Poland should remain in the EU,” Euractiv, November 24, 2020:  
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/87-of-poles-believe-poland-should-remain-in-the-eu/> (accessed November 25, 2020). 
9  This ban would eliminate the right to abortion in cases in which a prenatal examination indicated a high probability of severe and irreversible impairment 
of the fetus or an incurable, life-threatening disease. It was inconsistent with Poland’s constitution, which allows abortion in the event of a threat to the 
mother’s life or rape.
10  There have been multiple analyses of the situation and options by leading experts. See, for instance: Lucas Guttenberg and Piotr Buras, “Wie die EU den 
Spieß umdrehen kann” [How the EU can turn the tables], Zeit Online, November 23, 2020: <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2020-11/veto-eu-haushalt-
polen-ungarn-erpressung-corona-hilfen-rechtsstaatlichkeit?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F>; R. Daniel Kelemen, “Von der Leyen is 
weak on rule of law,” Politico, September 21, 2020:  
<https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-weak-rule-of-law/>; Daniel Hegedus, “Three EU exits from Poland and Hungary ‘hostage crisis,’” 
EUobserver, November 18, 2020: <https://euobserver.com/opinion/150098> (all accessed on November 25, 2020). 
adequately prepare for a second wave of COVID-19 
– failings that have been compounded by the lack of 
health care reform, which PiS abandoned in favor of 
direct social transfers.
Here then, is a government in turmoil. Leading pol-
iticians are growing ready to use the EU as a po-
litical football to deflect from domestic concerns, 
but they are likely to see it rebound and hit them. 
Although support for European integration is very 
high in Poland, this does not directly translate into 
votes – neither positively for pro-European parties, 
nor negatively for Euroskeptic parties. This is a field, 
in other words, in which the EU can gain more by 
sticking to a principled line than trying to pick win-
ners or enter into transactions.
THE EU HAS MORE OPTIONS 
THAN MEETS THE EYE 
But can the other member states steer the EU in-
to taking a clear, principled line on the multiannu-
al budget? The degree of difficulty of adopting a new 
MFF every seven years has been compared to that 
of EU treaty change. Reaching a deal on the current 
budgetary package will be harder still. It will require 
agreement on not just one bit of legislation but three:
1. A deal on the Multiannual Financial  
Framework itself
2. A decision on the EU’s own resources 
3. A deal on the rule of law mechanism 
Regardless of Poland and Hungary’s domestic diffi-
culties, therefore, the two countries currently appear 
to have several avenues to block progress before the 
package even comes before the European Council for 
a vote. And yet, this impression is too bleak. An as-
sessment of the three main options available to the 
other EU governments suggests that a principled 
approach is possible – if they care to take it.10
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Option 1: Carry On with the EU Budget  
Negotiations and Find a Compromise
The path of least resistance seems to be for the Ger-
man presidency to muddle through, searching for 
a means to allow Hungary and Poland to withdraw 
their vetoes and all sides to claim victory. There is 
speculation that a political declaration could provide 
the necessary fig leaf. Legally non-binding, but po-
litically marketable, such a declaration would pro-
claim that the rule of law mechanism would not limit 
the sovereignty of any member state. This deal could 
be eased in with a transactional approach, aimed at 
driving a wedge between the two outliers – in partic-
ular, isolating Hungary.11 This might involve the stick 
of threatening to tweak the allocation key on struc-
tural funds or the carrot of allocating the seat of the 
EU’s new cyber center to Poland. A fudge of this kind 
would, however, risk the ire of the European Parlia-
ment. It could also carry severe long-term political 
costs now that this crisis has been defined as a test 
of the EU’s commitment to its principles. Choosing 
this option would also shift the onus back to the EU’s 
other rule of law mechanisms – Articles 7 and 19 of 
the Treaty on European Union, the European Pub-
lic Prosecutor’s Office, and the rule of law peer re-
view – all of which have so far proved limited in their 
effectiveness.12
Option 2: Accept the Impasse and Move Toward 
Enhanced Cooperation
A second option would be to abandon the idea of 
pushing through all three pieces of the budget pack-
age together, and instead find a more piecemeal way 
forward. The first step would be to force a vote on 
the rule of law mechanism. Unlike the other two 
pieces of legislation which require consensus, this 
measure requires only a qualified majority vote in 
Council. Agreement there would pull the rug out 
from under Poland and Hungary at once. If the duo 
persisted in blocking progress on the other two pro-
posals, the member states could proceed with en-
hanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation allows 
for a sub-group of member states to cooperate on an 
initiative within the structures of the EU. While it is 
not applicable to the MFF itself, it could be used for a 
novel instrument like the RRF. By this means, a large 
coalition of member states could embed the RRF in 
11  Hungary is a small member state and relies on the much larger Poland to uphold its veto. If it had been left alone in this affair, Budapest would likely 
have been rather more timid.
12  On Article 19, see: Gerald Knauss, “An Article 19 Mechanism to save the rule of law in the EU,” European Security Initiative Newsletter, August 5, 2020: 
<https://www.esiweb.org/sites/default/files/newsletter/pdf/ESI%20-%20An%20Article%2019%20Mechanism%20to%20save%20rule%20of%20law%20
in%20the%20EU%20-%205%20August%202020.pdf> (accessed Novmeber 25, 2020). 
13  This fear has grown following the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. When the UK left, Poland lost a strong partner that was not a member of the 
eurozone (or Schengen Area) and that had historically fought against the emergence of an exclusive hardcore of EU members.
the EU’s legal framework but disburse funds only to 
a coalition of the willing. And yet, this would raise a 
number of protracted technical and legal challenges 
– and could certainly be met with a veto on the EU 
budget and the own resources, leaving the EU with-
out a new budget in 2021. 
Option 3: Agree on the RRF Under an Exclusive 
Intergovernmental Arrangement
The third option is to return to the idea, first pro-
posed by France, of an intergovernmental agree-
ment among a coalition of states for the RRF, thereby 
removing the veto power on its implementation. 
This was avoided at the time mainly because of the 
desire to display unity, but also because of the spec-
ter of “differentiated integration,” which many 
capitals – in particular, Berlin – dislike. An intergov-
ernmental agreement could well be achieved rapidly, 
but it would sit outside of the EU’s legal framework 
and weaken the control of the European Parlia-
ment. It might also see governments reopen the RRF 
spending key and raise complicated questions about 
the EU borrowing on behalf of an intergovernmental 
vehicle. Moreover, it would not solve the question of 
the multiannual budget, which is a substantial part of 
the recovery plan. Member states did, however, suc-
cessfully take this path with the Fiscal Compact in 
2011 and the European Stability Mechanism in 2012. 
Taking it again would be an important political signal 
to countries tempted to ransom the EU. Poland, in 
particular, remains viscerally afraid of the prospect 
of its marginalization by the “EU core.”13 
The option of a large 
coalition forging ahead 
without Hungary or  
Poland is sub-optimal.
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THE ROLE OF THE GERMAN 
PRESIDENCY
Germany currently holds the EU presidency, and it 
has refused to behave like other countries in this 
role. It refused, for instance, to trumpet the MFF 
pre-deal in July and has instead operated with the 
quiet attempts at mutual accommodation that have 
typified its diplomacy since the financial crisis. That 
low-key approach considerably diminishes Poland 
and Hungary’s hold over Berlin: it means the Ger-
man presidency is not bound to tying up the MFF 
as a prestige project before its semester ends. This 
should allow it to resist the temptation for a quick fix 
and coolly assess the weakness of Poland and Hun-
gary – not least their relative isolation within Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
And yet, Berlin will likely continue with its quiet 
attempts at accommodation and use this critical 
distance to defuse diplomatic tensions and fash-
ion a suitable compromise. After all, it hardly seems 
worth taking a principled stand here. The rule of law 
mechanism is weak and narrow – little more than a 
tool for preventing the misuse of the budget. A tool 
like the Article 7 mechanism, by contrast, which al-
lows for a suspension of a member’s voting rights, 
seems more germane. But such a course would be a 
mistake: the EU-25 cannot abandon the rule of law 
mechanism just because they have already watered 
it down – especially when dealing with a governing 
political class like Hungary’s, which seems to care 
more about the flow of cash from the EU than vot-
ing rights.
This is a critical juncture for the EU, and, while 
other member states prevaricate, Viktor Orbán’s 
Fidesz party has continued resolutely along its path 
away from liberal democracy and the rule of law. 
Exploiting the noise and fury of the budgetary cri-
sis, the governing majority in Budapest has quietly 
pushed through a domestic electoral amendment 
designed to curtail the ability of opposition parties 
to run in the upcoming 2022 elections. And as divi-
sions emerge between the EU-25, Polish Prime Min-
ister Morawiecki has made a point to visit Orbán in 
Budapest and forge a common line – evidently in ex-
pectation of accommodation when the pair return to 
Brussels.14
14  N.N., “Sobolewski on Morawiecki’s visit to Hungary: The goal is to establish a position on the EU budget,” Polishnews, November 25, 2020:  
<https://www.polishnews.co.uk/sobolewski-on-morawieckis-visit-to-hungary-the-goal-is-to-establish-a-position-on-the-eu-budget-policy/> (accessed 
November 25, 2020). 
15  It should also be noted that Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, the only prime minister to express his approval for Hungary and Poland, relies on 
media outlets at home that are owned by Hungarian oligarchs who are reputedly close to Orbán.
But the divisions between the member states are 
not as great as expected. In previous years, facing 
disciplinary cases launched under Article 7, War-
saw and Budapest could rely on tacit support from 
some of their neighbors. This time, there is only crit-
icism from them. The foreign ministers of the other 
two Visegrad states, the Czech Republic and Slova-
kia, welcomed the compromise deal negotiated by 
the German EU presidency and spoke out against 
the veto. Thus, an unintended side effect of this cri-
sis could be a growing divide between Orbán and 
two – if not, three – Central European societies. And 
not just them. Romania’s Prime Minister Ludovic 
Orban chastised his Hungarian and Polish counter-
parts, reminding them that his country, like other 
eastern members, sorely needs financial assistance.15 
The other member states are well placed to call the 
EU-2’s bluff and broach the possibility of moving 
ahead without them. The option of a large coalition 
of EU member states forging ahead without Hunga-
ry or Poland is, of course, sub-optimal. It is legally 
complex and may sow divisions which take years to 
overcome. Indeed, observers – particularly, in Poland 
– would say that these exclusive EU clubs are at the 
heart of the EU’s current problems. They prevent-
ed Warsaw from properly influencing eurozone and 
Schengen policies, thereby pushing it into a spoiler 
role. And it is true that, as a vehicle of inclusive inte-
gration, the option of a coalition of the willing club-
bing together may have failed. It may be better suited 
to be a tool of discipline.
The era of quiet accommodation and transactional 
deals in the European Council must surely be com-
ing to an end. When German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel leaves office, it is Orbán who will take her 
place as the longest-serving political operator there. 
A face-saving fudge on the MFF – or even the asser-
tive exploitation by the EU-25 of Poland and Hun-
gary’s asymmetrical need for EU cash – would set a 
poor precedent for the new era of European integra-
tion. These cannot be the only tools for resolving this 
crisis. A more principled stand on this vital issue of 
European integration is required to ensure the Euro-
pean Union remains a club worth belonging to.
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